LiteLLM bug exploited 36 hours after its disclosure


CVE-2026-42208: LiteLLM bug exploited 36 hours after its disclosure

Pierluigi Paganini
April 29, 2026

Attackers quickly exploited a critical LiteLLM flaw (CVE-2026-42208) to access and modify sensitive database data via SQL injection.

Attackers rapidly exploited a critical vulnerability in LiteLLM Python package, tracked as CVE-2026-42208, just days after it became public. The vulnerability, an SQL injection in the proxy API key verification process, lets attackers access and potentially modify database data.

Instead of safely passing the key as a parameter, it directly inserts the user-supplied value into a database query. This unsafe practice opens the door to SQL injection.

An attacker doesn’t need valid credentials. By sending a specially crafted Authorization header to an API endpoint (such as /chat/completions), they can manipulate the query executed by the database. Because the request flows through an error-handling path, the malicious input still reaches the vulnerable query.

“A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy’s error-handling path.” reads the BerriAI’s advisory. “An attacker could read data from the proxy’s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.”

Researchers observed real-world attacks targeting sensitive information stored in database tables, highlighting how quickly disclosed flaws can turn into active threats.

The flaw affects LiteLLM versions 1.81.16 to 1.83.6 and was fixed in 1.83.7 on April 19, 2026. The Sysdig Threat Research Team reported that attackers began exploiting it about 36 hours after disclosure.

“The Sysdig Threat Research Team (TRT) observed the first exploitation attempt 36 hours and seven minutes after the advisory was published to the global database.” reads the report published by Sysdig. “The traffic the Sysdig TRT captured was not a generic SQLmap spray, which is very common in SQL injection attacks, but a deliberate, and likely customized, enumeration of the production LiteLLM schema, targeting the three tables that hold the highest-value secrets: virtual API keys, stored provider credentials, and the proxy’s environment-variable configuration.

The attacker showed strong knowledge of LiteLLM’s database structure and quickly mapped table schemas, but researchers saw no signs of data theft or further compromise.

“We did not see follow-through, however. There were no authenticated calls using exfiltrated keys, no virtual-key minting via /key/generate, and no chained reuse of provider credentials.” continues the report. “The novelty of this finding is the speed and precision of the schema-enumeration attempt, not a confirmed compromise.”

Sysdig published indicators of compromise for attacks exploiting this vulnerability.

Users who can’t upgrade their installs are suggested to enable disable_error_logs: true in general settings to block the attack path and reduce exposure.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, LiteLLM)







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