Europol Disrupts StealC and Amadey Malware Infrastructure in Operation Endgame


Europol Disrupts StealC and Amadey Malware Infrastructure in Operation Endgame

Pierluigi Paganini
June 24, 2026

Operation Endgame disrupted malware services like StealC and Amadey that enable ransomware, fraud, and attacks on critical infrastructure.

Between June 15 and 19, 2026, Europol coordinated a two-week law enforcement operation involving agencies from Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, alongside private firms like Microsoft, Bitdefender, IBM X-Force, Proofpoint, Infoblox, Shadowserver, Orange Cyberdefense, and a dozen other private partners.

The operation targeted the infrastructure behind three malware families, SocGholish, Amadey, and StealC, that together form the opening stages of the cybercrime attack chain.

“The main common goal was to disrupt the “assembly lines” cybercriminals use to launch ransomware, financial fraud, and attacks on critical infrastructure.” reads the report published by EUROPOL. “Crypto assets of criminal origin currently valued at over EUR 41 million (USD 47 million) were identified, flagged, and thereby restricted from use. “

The numbers from the action are substantial. Law enforcement and private partners actioned 326 servers and 142 domains, recovered 27 million stolen login credentials, and identified, flagged, and restricted over €41 million in criminal cryptocurrency assets.

During the SocGholish portion of the operation, 14,971 infected websites were remediated, including restaurants, auto repair shops, and other everyday businesses whose WordPress installations had been quietly compromised and turned into malware distribution points. The Dutch Police removed vulnerabilities from infected sites and notified owners directly.

SocGholish works by injecting fake browser update prompts into legitimate websites. A visitor clicks what looks like a routine update, and the malware installs.

“This approach, which has caused countless victims, is primarily done by hacking websites built with WordPress and infecting them with malware.” continues the report.” The unauthorised access was then exploited for further crimes, such as installing ransomware for the purpose of digital extortion.”

SocGholish is linked to Evil Corp, the Russian cybercriminal group previously responsible for Zeus and Dridex, and associated with multiple large-scale ransomware and money-laundering operations.

Amadey has been running since October 2018 as a paid dropper service, spreading primarily through phishing campaigns. It gains initial access, delivers additional malware, and also has credential and clipboard stealing capabilities. StealC, which surfaced in January 2023, is the harvesting layer: it pulls passwords, stored credentials, digital identities, and sensitive data from compromised machines and makes them available for resale and fraud.

“Amadey gains initial access to devices, while StealC extracts passwords and sensitive data.” states the report. “Together, they form a critical link in the cybercrime supply chain.”

Microsoft linked both families to over 140,000 infected computers worldwide in just the first two weeks of May 2026.

The operational logic behind targeting these three families simultaneously is what makes this phase of Operation Endgame strategically significant. Rather than focusing on the ransomware payload at the end of the chain, the operation hit the tools that make every subsequent stage possible.

“Operation Endgame targets the initial access malware used to infect devices. Cybercriminals use this malware as a gateway to silently infiltrate victims’ systems and steal sensitive data.” reads the press release published by EuroJust. “By fighting the initial stage of the attack chain, the operation strikes at the heart of the entire ‘cybercrime-as-a-service’ ecosystem.”

Take out the loader, and the ransomware operator has no foothold to monetize.

Victim notifications went out through HaveIBeenPwned, DIVD, Spamhaus, CheckjeHack, NoMoreLeaks, Shadowserver, and the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre. WordPress site owners whose credentials were leaked have been urged to change login credentials, enable multi-factor authentication, delete any unknown admin accounts, and keep their installations updated. For ordinary users, the advice on SocGholish is the same it’s always been and apparently still needs repeating: genuine software updates come from official sources through system settings or app stores, not from browser pop-ups that scream for immediate action.

Operation Endgame is described by Europol as the largest international operation ever undertaken to tackle ransomware enablers worldwide. More than 30 public and private parties support its actions on an ongoing basis.

The operation has an active suspect portal. The message from every law enforcement statement is consistent: each takedown raises costs, degrades operations, and generates intelligence for the next one.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Operation Endgame)







Source link

Leave a Reply

Subscribe to Our Newsletter

Get our latest articles delivered straight to your inbox. No spam, we promise.

Recent Reviews


Ghost CMS flaw abused to push ClickFix attacks on hundreds of sites

Pierluigi Paganini
May 25, 2026

Threat actors are actively exploiting a security flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-26980, in Ghost CMS that was fixed months ago in real attacks against unpatched websites. According to Qianxin, the campaign has already affected more than 700 sites, including well-known organizations and universities.

The vulnerability is an SQL injection issue in Ghost’s Content API that can let an attacker read data from the database without logging in. In the worst case, this can expose the Admin API key, which can allow attackers to take over the site.

That key matters because it can be used to change published content. In this campaign, attackers used it to edit articles on compromised Ghost sites and insert malicious JavaScript at the end of pages. The goal was not just defacement, but to turn trusted websites into launch points for further malware delivery.

“After an in-depth investigation and analysis, we determined that this was not a targeted intrusion against the customer, but rather a large-scale poisoning campaign by an in-the-wild attack group targeting Ghost CMS. Although CVE-2026-26980 was publicly disclosed as early as February 19, a large number of users did not patch and upgrade in time, providing an opportunity for attackers.” reads the advisory published by Qianxin. “At least two groups are currently actively conducting such poisoning operations, and some sites have even become the target of competition between the two parties, with different malicious code being implanted one after another within a single day.”

The inserted code led visitors through a two-step chain. First, the page loaded a remote script that checked the browser and decided what the visitor should see. Then real victims were redirected to a fake verification page that looked like a normal “I’m human” check.

This is where the ClickFix part began. The page told users to press Windows+R, paste a command, and hit Enter. In practice, that command downloaded and started a malware payload on the victim’s machine. It was a classic social engineering trick: make the user do the dangerous part themselves.

Qianxin says the first signs of this activity appeared in early May. The malicious code found in the campaign had a compilation date of February 16, the same day Ghost announced the fix for CVE-2026-26980. That suggests the attackers moved quickly once they saw how many sites had not been updated.

The affected websites cover a wide range of sectors. Roughly half are personal blogs or independent sites, but the list also includes technology blogs, AI sites, media outlets, crypto projects, and educational institutions. Qianxin researchers say victims include sites linked to Harvard, Oxford, and DuckDuckGo.

The attack chain was also designed to be flexible. The loaders could fetch different payloads depending on the target, and the operators changed infrastructure several times.

“entire attack process has obvious five-stage characteristics of “CMS Takeover → Page Poisoning → Two-stage Loading → Social Engineering Lure (FakeCaptcha/ClickFix) → Malware Delivery”, and the entire process is highly automated: bulk vulnerability scanning → automatic key extraction → bulk injection → dynamic C2 distribution.” states the report.

In some cases, they switched domains after detection, keeping the campaign alive even when part of the chain was blocked.

“Through feature scanning of publicly accessible pages, we have cumulatively identified more than 700 poisoned victim domains, and have proactively contacted the sites for which contact information could be obtained, notifying them of the poisoning.” continues the report.

Qianxin also believes at least two different groups are involved. In some cases, the same site was hit more than once, with one attacker replacing the code left by another. That makes the campaign harder to clean up and shows how attractive compromised Ghost sites have become for abuse.

For site owners, the advice is straightforward. Ghost should be updated immediately, all credentials should be rotated, and site logs should be reviewed for suspicious admin API activity. Any injected scripts should be removed from the database itself, not just from the visual editor. Visitors who may have reached a poisoned site should also be warned.

The report includes Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for the attacks observed by the researchers.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ghost CMS)







Source link