eBay rejects GameStop’s $56bn bid as “neither credible nor attractive”


Ryan Cohen offered $125 a share, partly to be funded by a $20bn TD Securities commitment letter and, briefly, by selling old store signs on eBay itself. The eBay board, which had to ban and then unban him during the process, says no.


eBay has formally rejected GameStop’s $56bn takeover bid, telling the video-game retailer’s CEO Ryan Cohen on Tuesday that his proposal is “neither credible nor attractive.”

Paul Pressler, the chairman of eBay’s board, set out the rejection in a letter that was unusually direct by the standards of US M&A correspondence. “

The Board, with the support of its independent advisors, has thoroughly reviewed your proposal and has determined to reject it,” Pressler wrote.

The board cited uncertainty around GameStop’s acquisition financing and the leverage and operational risks of combining the two businesses.

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Cohen’s offer, unveiled on 4 May, was a cash-and-stock proposal at $125 per eBay share, a 20% premium to the previous close. The cash half was to be funded by a $20bn commitment letter from TD Securities.

The letter, which Cohen made public, came with a condition that the combined company would need to retain an investment-grade credit rating after the deal closed. Moody’s promptly described the proposed acquisition as “credit negative” for eBay because of the leverage implied. Without an investment-grade rating, the TD facility would not draw.

There was also a separate, unconventional funding component. On 7 May, Cohen announced on X that he intended to sell items from his GameStop office, including store signs and old carpet, on eBay’s own marketplace to help fund the bid. Calculations done at the time suggested the listed items would have raised approximately $138,000 against the $56bn purchase price.

eBay suspended Cohen’s seller account within ten hours of his post. The account was subsequently reinstated on 8 May after eBay determined the suspension had been triggered by automated systems.

The episode briefly produced the spectacle of the target of a $56bn takeover banning the bidder from its own platform, then reversing.

Investor reaction has been mixed. Michael Burry of Scion Asset Management closed his GameStop position shortly after Cohen’s announcement, telling CNBC: “Never confuse debt for creativity.”

GameStop shares have fallen since the bid was made public; eBay shares have held above the $125 offer level for parts of the past week, suggesting market participants assigned low probability to the deal completing.

Cohen has indicated he is willing to take the offer directly to eBay shareholders through a special meeting, but the path to a hostile bid runs through the same financing obstacle that prompted the board’s rejection.

A combined GameStop-eBay entity with $20bn of additional acquisition debt is widely considered unlikely to retain an investment-grade rating, which would void the TD letter and leave roughly half the offer unfunded.

GameStop’s existing business is significantly smaller than eBay’s. GameStop ended the most recent fiscal year with roughly $4bn of revenue against eBay’s $10.3bn. The cash portion of the proposed deal exceeds GameStop’s current market capitalisation.

The structural mismatch has been at the centre of the analyst commentary since the bid was announced.

GameStop has not yet commented on the rejection. Cohen’s public statements over the past week have focused on his commitment to the deal and his willingness to engage directly with shareholders. eBay’s board has not commented beyond Pressler’s letter.

The episode adds to the list of unconventional moves Cohen has run since taking over GameStop. The company’s earlier transformations, the meme-stock cycle of 2021, the move into NFTs and back out again, and a sustained programme of cost-cutting and treasury management, have all played out in public view.

The eBay bid was always going to be the largest such move; it appears to have concluded earlier than Cohen would have preferred.



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In short: Accel has raised $5 billion in new capital, comprising a $4 billion Leaders Fund V and a $650 million sidecar, targeting 20-25 late-stage AI investments at an average cheque size of $200 million. The raise follows standout returns from its Anthropic stake (invested at $183B, now valued near $800B) and Cursor (backed at $9.9B, now reportedly around $50B), and lands in a Q1 2026 venture market that deployed a record $297 billion.

Accel, the venture capital firm behind early bets on Facebook, Slack, and more recently Anthropic and Cursor, has raised $5 billion in new capital aimed squarely at AI. The raise, reported by Bloomberg, comprises $4 billion for its fifth Leaders Fund and a $650 million sidecar vehicle, positioning the firm to write average cheques of around $200 million into late-stage AI companies globally.

The fund lands in a venture capital market that has lost any pretence of restraint. Q1 2026 saw $297 billion flow into startups worldwide, 2.5 times the total from Q4 2025 and the most venture funding ever recorded in a three-month period. Andreessen Horowitz has raised $15 billion. Thrive Capital has closed more than $10 billion. Founders Fund is finishing a $6 billion raise. Accel’s $5 billion is substantial but not exceptional in a market where the biggest funds are measured in the tens of billions.

The portfolio that made the pitch

What distinguishes Accel’s fundraise is the portfolio it can point to. The firm invested in Anthropic during its Series G at a $183 billion valuation. Anthropic has since closed a round at $380 billion and is now attracting offers at roughly $800 billion, meaning Accel’s stake has more than quadrupled in value in a matter of months. Anthropic’s annualised revenue has hit $30 billion, a trajectory that no company in history has matched.

The firm’s bet on Cursor has been similarly well-timed. Accel backed the AI code editor in June 2025 at a $9.9 billion valuation. By November, Cursor had raised again at $29.3 billion. By March 2026, the company was reportedly in discussions at a valuation of around $50 billion. For a developer tool that barely existed two years ago, the appreciation is extraordinary.

Accel’s broader AI portfolio extends beyond these two headline positions. The firm has backed Vercel, the frontend deployment platform; n8n, an AI-powered automation tool; Recraft, a professional design platform; and Code Metal, which builds AI development tools for hardware and defence applications. In March 2026, Accel launched an Atoms AI programme in partnership with Google’s AI Futures Fund, selecting five early-stage companies from what it described as a global applicant pool focused on “white space” opportunities in enterprise AI.

The Leaders Fund model

Accel’s Leaders Fund series is designed for later-stage investments, the kind of large cheques that growth-stage AI companies now require. With an average investment size of $200 million and a target of 20 to 25 deals from the new $4 billion fund, the strategy is concentrated: a small number of high-conviction bets on companies that have already demonstrated product-market fit and are scaling revenue.

This is a different game from traditional venture capital. At $200 million per cheque, Accel is competing less with seed and Series A firms and more with the mega-funds, sovereign wealth funds, and corporate investors that have flooded into late-stage AI. The firm’s argument is that its early-stage relationships and technical evaluation capabilities give it an edge in identifying which companies deserve capital at scale, and in securing allocations in rounds that are massively oversubscribed.

Founded in 1983 by Arthur Patterson and Jim Swartz, Accel built its reputation on what the founders called the “prepared mind” approach, a philosophy of deep sector research before investments materialise. The firm’s most famous prepared-mind bet was its 2005 investment of $12.7 million for 10% of Facebook, a stake worth $6.6 billion at the company’s IPO seven years later. The question now is whether Accel’s AI bets will produce returns of comparable magnitude.

What the market is pricing

The sheer volume of capital flowing into AI venture funds reflects a market consensus that artificial intelligence will be the dominant technology platform of the next decade. The numbers are difficult to overstate. OpenAI raised $120 billion in 2026. Anthropic has raised more than $50 billion. xAI closed $20 billion. Waymo secured $16 billion. These are not venture-scale numbers; they are infrastructure-scale capital deployments that would have been unthinkable outside of telecommunications or energy a decade ago.

For limited partners, the investors who commit capital to venture funds, the logic is straightforward: the returns from AI’s winners will be so large that even paying premium valuations will generate exceptional multiples. Accel’s Anthropic position, where a single investment has appreciated several times over in months, is exactly the kind of outcome that makes LPs willing to commit $5 billion to a single firm’s next fund.

The risk is equally visible. Venture capital is a cyclical business, and the current fundraising boom has the characteristics of a cycle peak: record fund sizes, compressed deployment timelines, and a concentration of capital in a single sector. The last time venture capital raised this aggressively, during the 2021 ZIRP era, many of those investments were marked down significantly within two years. AI’s commercial traction is far stronger than the crypto and fintech bets that defined that earlier cycle, but the valuations being paid today leave little margin for error.

The concentration question

Accel’s fund also highlights a structural shift in venture capital. The industry is bifurcating into a small number of mega-firms that can write cheques of $100 million or more and a long tail of smaller funds that compete for earlier-stage deals. The middle ground, the traditional Series B and C investors, is being squeezed by mega-funds moving downstream and by AI companies that skip traditional funding stages entirely, going from seed round to billion-dollar valuations in 18 months.

For a firm like Accel, which operates across offices in Palo Alto, San Francisco, London, and India, the $5 billion raise is a bet that it can maintain its position in the top tier as fund sizes inflate and competition for the best deals intensifies. Its portfolio of 1,199 companies, 107 unicorns, and 46 IPOs provides a track record. But in a market where Anthropic alone could generate returns that justify an entire fund, the temptation to concentrate bets on a handful of AI winners is strong, and the consequences of getting those bets wrong are correspondingly severe.

The broader picture is that AI venture capital has entered a phase where the funds themselves are becoming as large as the companies they once backed. Accel’s $5 billion raise would have made it one of the most valuable startups in Europe just a few years ago. Now it is table stakes for a firm that wants to participate meaningfully in the rounds that matter. Whether this represents rational capital allocation or the peak of a cycle that will eventually correct is the question that every LP writing a cheque today is, implicitly or explicitly, answering in the affirmative.



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