In the second half of 2024, the growing group of scientists assembled the report and wrote the policy forum for Science. Relman briefed policymakers at the White House, members of the defense community, and the National Security Agency. Researchers met with the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. “We briefed the United Nations, the UK government, the government of Singapore, scientific funding organizations from Brazil,” says Glass. “We’ve talked to the Chinese government indirectly. We were trying to not blindside anybody.” 

A year and a half on, the push has had an impact. UNESCO has recommended a precautionary global moratorium on creating mirror-life cells, and major philanthropic organizations that fund science, including the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, have announced they will not finance research leading to a mirror microorganism. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists highlighted considerations about mirror life in its most recent report on the Doomsday Clock. In March, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board issued a brief highlighting the risks—noting, for example, that recent progress on building mirror molecules could reduce the cost of creating a mirror microbe. 

“I think no one really believes at this stage that we should make mirror life, based on the evidence that’s available,” says James Smith, the scientist who leads the MBDF, the nonprofit focused on assessing the risks of mirror life, which is funded by Coefficient Giving, the Sloan Foundation, and other organizations. The challenge now, Smith says, is for scientists to work with policymakers and bioethicists to figure out how much research on mirror life should be permitted—and who will enforce the rules.

Drawing the line

Not everyone is convinced that mirror organisms pose an existential threat. It’s difficult to verify predictions about how mirror microbes would fare in the immune system—or the larger world—without running experiments on them. Some scientists have pushed back against the doomsday scenario, suggesting that the case against mirror life offers an “inflated view of the danger.” Others have noted that carbohydrates called glycans already exist in both left- and right-handed forms—even in pathogens—and the immune system can recognize both of them. Experiments focused on interactions between the immune system and mirror molecules, they say, could help clarify the risks of mirror organisms and reduce uncertainty. 

Even among those convinced that the worst-case scenario is possible, researchers still disagree over where to draw the line. What inquiries should be allowed and what should be prohibited?

Andy Ellington, a biotechnologist and synthetic biologist at the University of Texas at Austin, doesn’t think mirror organisms will come to fruition anytime soon. Even if they do, he isn’t sure they will pose a threat. “If there is going to be harm done to the human race, this is about position 382 on my list,” he says. But at the same time, he says it’s a complicated issue worth studying more, and he wants to see the conversations continue: “We’re operating in a space where there’s so much unknown that it’s very difficult for us to do risk assessment.” 

Even among those convinced that the worst-case scenario is possible, researchers still disagree over where to draw the line. What inquiries should be allowed and what should be prohibited? 

Adamala, of the University of Minnesota, and others see a natural line at ribosomes, the cellular factories that transform chains of amino acids into proteins. These would be a critical ingredient in creating a self-replicating organism, and Adamala says the path to getting there once mirror ribosomes are in place would be pretty straightforward. But Zhu, at Westlake, and others counter that it’s worth developing mirror ribosomes because they could possibly produce medically useful peptides and proteins more efficiently than traditional chemical methods. He sees a clear distinction, and a foundational gap, between that kind of technology and the creation of a living synthetic organism. “It is crucial to distinguish mirror-image molecular biology from mirror-image life,” he says. That said, he points out that many synthetic molecules and organisms containing unnatural components, including but not limited to the mirror-image subset, might pose health risks. Researchers, he says, should focus on developing holistic guidelines to cover such risks—not just those from mirror molecules. 

Even if the exact risk remains uncertain, Esvelt remains more convinced than ever that the work should be paused, perhaps indefinitely. No one has taken a meaningful swing at the hypothesis that mirror life could wipe out everything, he says. The primary uncertainties aren’t around whether mirror life is dangerous, he points out; they have more to do with identifying which bacterium—including what genes it encodes, what it eats, how it evades the immune system’s sentinels—could lead to the most serious consequences. “The risk of losing everything, like the entire future of humanity integrated over time, is not worth any small fraction of the economy. You just don’t muck around with existential risk like that,” he says.