Date: 25 June 2026

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When organisations discuss major cyber incidents, attention often focuses on the attack itself. Questions typically centre on how attackers gained access, what malware was used, and how much data was compromised. The cyber attack against Comhairle nan Eilean Siar (Western Isles Council) tells a different story.

The most important lesson from this incident is not the intrusion. It is the recovery.

 Nearly two years after the ransomware attack was first detected, key systems remained only partially restored, recovery costs had reached approximately £500,000, and multiple post-incident recommendations were still awaiting implementation. The incident has become one of the most significant cyber resilience case studies for UK local government. 

What Happened?

On 7 November 2023, Western Isles Council detected a ransomware attack and reported the incident to Police Scotland. Public confirmation followed within days as the council began assessing the scale of the disruption.

The attack restricted access to council servers and core systems, resulting in a near-total loss of use of data held on file share servers. Critical council operations were significantly disrupted, particularly within finance functions. Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rates billing were among the services affected. While the specific attack vector has not been publicly disclosed, attackers reportedly gained unauthorised access to council systems before deploying malware that encrypted data and disabled access.

Immediate Response

Following detection, the council moved quickly to contain the incident. Affected systems were taken offline, and support was sought from Police Scotland, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the Scottish Government and external technology partners. Staff developed manual workarounds to maintain essential services, while cloud-based email systems enabled continued external communication. Front-line services and payments to staff and suppliers were prioritised throughout the recovery effort. 

The response itself was widely recognised as effective given the circumstances. However, as subsequent reviews revealed, effective incident response alone does not guarantee effective recovery.

The Recovery Challenge

What makes this incident particularly noteworthy is the length of time required to recover. According to Audit Scotland’s independent review, critical systems supporting housing benefits, council tax and non-domestic rates remained not fully restored almost two years after the attack. Recovery costs were estimated at around £500,000, with the full financial impact still emerging. 

This raises an uncomfortable but increasingly important question: How prepared is your organisation for a recovery effort measured in years rather than weeks?

Many organisations invest heavily in prevention technologies but devote far less attention to long-term recovery planning. The Western Isles incident demonstrates that resilience depends on much more than preventing initial compromise.

Governance and Preparedness Gaps

Post-incident reviews highlighted several issues that existed before the attack occurred. At the time of the incident, five of the council’s seventeen IT positions were vacant, including a senior systems analyst role. Reports also suggested that wider staff cybersecurity awareness training had lapsed.

More significantly, the Accounts Commission found that known weaknesses had already been identified before the attack but had not been fully addressed. This is a challenge many organisations face.

Security assessments, audits and risk reviews often identify vulnerabilities and control gaps. Yet competing priorities, budget constraints and resource limitations can delay remediation efforts. The problem is that cyber criminals rarely wait for organisations to catch up.

Recovery Is Not the Same as Resilience

One of the most valuable lessons from this incident is the distinction between recovery and resilience. Recovery focuses on restoring systems after an incident. Resilience focuses on maintaining operations despite disruption and improving organisational capability over time. The council’s own internal Cyber Attack Response report issued ten recommendations in October 2024. By September 2025, only five had been fully implemented.

This highlights a challenge frequently overlooked after major incidents. Once systems begin returning to normal, improvement initiatives can lose momentum. True resilience requires sustained investment, governance oversight and executive commitment long after media attention fades.

The Human Impact of Cyber Incidents

Technology was not the only casualty.

Staff were required to develop manual workarounds while continuing their normal responsibilities. This created significant additional workload and pressure over an extended period. The incident serves as a reminder that cyber crises are people crises as much as technology crises.

Organisations should ensure incident response and business continuity plans account for workforce wellbeing, resource allocation, internal communications and decision-making during prolonged recovery periods.

Key Lessons for Organisations

The Western Isles Council cyber attack provides several important lessons for organisations across all sectors:

  • Test incident response and business continuity plans regularly.
  • Validate backup integrity and restoration capabilities.
  • Address known security weaknesses before attackers exploit them.
  • Ensure adequate staffing and cyber governance structures.
  • Include workforce resilience in recovery planning.
  • Treat post-incident improvement as a long-term programme.
  • Prepare boards and executives for prolonged recovery scenarios.

Perhaps most importantly, organisations should stop measuring resilience solely by their ability to prevent attacks. As the Accounts Commission noted, it is increasingly a question of when, not if, a cyber incident occurs. The organisations that recover most effectively will be those that have planned, tested and exercised their recovery capabilities long before an attack takes place.

The Western Isles Council incident demonstrates a reality every board and CISO should understand: The attack may last days. The recovery may last years. Download our CMA Cyber Insights Document on the Western Isles Ransomware Attack for more details on the attack and the lessons it contains.  

How CM-Alliance Helps Organisations Avoid Similar Outcomes

The Western Isles Council incident demonstrates that organisations don’t fail because a ransomware attack occurs. They struggle because they are unprepared for everything that comes afterwards. At CM-Alliance, we help organisations build resilience long before an incident happens. Our services are designed to test plans, strengthen decision-making and improve recovery capabilities, so organisations can continue operating even under significant pressure.

We can help your organisation:

  • Develop practical incident response plans that clearly define roles, responsibilities and escalation procedures.
  • Create cyber incident response playbooks for ransomware, data breaches and other high-impact cyber scenarios.
  • Run realistic cyber tabletop exercises that allow technical teams, executives and boards to practise responding to cyber crises in a controlled environment.
  • Deliver NCSC-Assured Cyber Incident Planning & Response (CIPR) training to equip incident response teams with the knowledge and confidence to manage real-world cyber incidents.
  • Prepare senior leadership for crisis decision-making, regulatory scrutiny and media pressure through executive cyber crisis exercises.
  • Review business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements to ensure critical services can continue during prolonged disruption.
  • Validate backup and recovery strategies to confirm systems can be restored quickly when they are needed most.

The biggest lesson from the Western Isles incident is that recovery should never be improvised. Organisations that invest in planning, training and regular exercising are far better placed to minimise disruption, recover faster and emerge stronger after a cyber incident.





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Recent Reviews


Ghost CMS flaw abused to push ClickFix attacks on hundreds of sites

Pierluigi Paganini
May 25, 2026

Threat actors are actively exploiting a security flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-26980, in Ghost CMS that was fixed months ago in real attacks against unpatched websites. According to Qianxin, the campaign has already affected more than 700 sites, including well-known organizations and universities.

The vulnerability is an SQL injection issue in Ghost’s Content API that can let an attacker read data from the database without logging in. In the worst case, this can expose the Admin API key, which can allow attackers to take over the site.

That key matters because it can be used to change published content. In this campaign, attackers used it to edit articles on compromised Ghost sites and insert malicious JavaScript at the end of pages. The goal was not just defacement, but to turn trusted websites into launch points for further malware delivery.

“After an in-depth investigation and analysis, we determined that this was not a targeted intrusion against the customer, but rather a large-scale poisoning campaign by an in-the-wild attack group targeting Ghost CMS. Although CVE-2026-26980 was publicly disclosed as early as February 19, a large number of users did not patch and upgrade in time, providing an opportunity for attackers.” reads the advisory published by Qianxin. “At least two groups are currently actively conducting such poisoning operations, and some sites have even become the target of competition between the two parties, with different malicious code being implanted one after another within a single day.”

The inserted code led visitors through a two-step chain. First, the page loaded a remote script that checked the browser and decided what the visitor should see. Then real victims were redirected to a fake verification page that looked like a normal “I’m human” check.

This is where the ClickFix part began. The page told users to press Windows+R, paste a command, and hit Enter. In practice, that command downloaded and started a malware payload on the victim’s machine. It was a classic social engineering trick: make the user do the dangerous part themselves.

Qianxin says the first signs of this activity appeared in early May. The malicious code found in the campaign had a compilation date of February 16, the same day Ghost announced the fix for CVE-2026-26980. That suggests the attackers moved quickly once they saw how many sites had not been updated.

The affected websites cover a wide range of sectors. Roughly half are personal blogs or independent sites, but the list also includes technology blogs, AI sites, media outlets, crypto projects, and educational institutions. Qianxin researchers say victims include sites linked to Harvard, Oxford, and DuckDuckGo.

The attack chain was also designed to be flexible. The loaders could fetch different payloads depending on the target, and the operators changed infrastructure several times.

“entire attack process has obvious five-stage characteristics of “CMS Takeover → Page Poisoning → Two-stage Loading → Social Engineering Lure (FakeCaptcha/ClickFix) → Malware Delivery”, and the entire process is highly automated: bulk vulnerability scanning → automatic key extraction → bulk injection → dynamic C2 distribution.” states the report.

In some cases, they switched domains after detection, keeping the campaign alive even when part of the chain was blocked.

“Through feature scanning of publicly accessible pages, we have cumulatively identified more than 700 poisoned victim domains, and have proactively contacted the sites for which contact information could be obtained, notifying them of the poisoning.” continues the report.

Qianxin also believes at least two different groups are involved. In some cases, the same site was hit more than once, with one attacker replacing the code left by another. That makes the campaign harder to clean up and shows how attractive compromised Ghost sites have become for abuse.

For site owners, the advice is straightforward. Ghost should be updated immediately, all credentials should be rotated, and site logs should be reviewed for suspicious admin API activity. Any injected scripts should be removed from the database itself, not just from the visual editor. Visitors who may have reached a poisoned site should also be warned.

The report includes Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) for the attacks observed by the researchers.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ghost CMS)







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